

SOCIAL IMPACT OF E-GOVERNANCE WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO BIHAR

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ABSTRACT

A modern model of governance to substitute adversarial and managerial forms of decision formation and execution has arisen over the past several decades. As it has come to be established, e-governance puts together public and private citizens to participate in consensus-oriented policy formation in collaborative forums of public authorities. In this paper, we are undertaking a meta-analytical review of current e-governance literature with the aim of creating an e-governance contingency model.

After analyzing 137 e-governance cases across a number of policy fields, we define crucial variables that will impact whether effective cooperation will be accomplished through this form of governance or not. These factors include the previous background of dispute or partnership, stakeholder incentives to engage, imbalances of power and wealth, leadership, and structural architecture. Within the collective phase itself, we also consider a variety of considerations that are important. Such aspects include face-to-face dialogue, building confidence, and the growth of dedication and mutual

understanding. We find that when collaborative forums concentrate on "small wins" that deepen confidence, participation, and mutual understanding, a virtuous circle of cooperation continues to grow. The article ends with a review of the consequences for practitioners of our contingency model and potential e-governance studies.

KEYWORDS:

Collaborative, Governance, Management

INTRODUCTION

A modern governance strategy called "E-governance" has evolved over the past two decades. In shared platforms for public bodies, this style of government brings many parties together to participate in consensus-oriented decision making. In this paper, we are undertaking a meta-analytical review of current e-governance literature with the aim of creating a general e-governance model. The overall aim is to establish a collective contingency strategy that can illustrate circumstances in which e-governance, as an approach to policy making and public administration, can be more or less successful.

We followed a technique we call "successive approximation" in performing this meta-analytic study: we used a sampling of the literature to establish a common vocabulary for evaluating e-governance and then successively "evaluated" this vocabulary against additional cases, improving and elaborating our e-governance model as we assessed additional cases. Although e-governance might now have a chic management cache, the

untidy essence of partnership literature illustrates the way it has bubbled up from many local experiments, mostly in response to previous shortcomings in governance.

In reaction to the shortcomings of downstream adoption and to the high expense and politicization of policy, e-governance has arisen. It has emerged as an alternative (especially as the authority of experts is challenged) to the adversarialism of interest group pluralism and to the transparency shortcomings of managerialism. More favorably, one might claim that collaborative patterns often emerge from the advancement of expertise and systemic power. The need for cooperation grows as expertise becomes more advanced and dispersed and as institutional infrastructures grow more diverse and interdependent.

As Gray (1989) has pointed out, the growing "chaos" experienced by policy makers and managers could be the universal measure for all these causes. While more general theoretical accounts of e-governance have been proposed by Susskind and Cruikshank (1987), Gray (1989), and Fung and Wright (2001, 2003), much of the literature focuses on the organisms instead of the genus. The majority of the e-governance literature consists of single-case case studies focusing on sector-specific governance concerns such as schools' site-based administration, neighborhood policing, environmental boards, regulatory negotiation, collaborative development, neighborhood health collaborations, and (species) natural resource management.

For starters, Healey (1996, 2003) and Innes and Booher (1999a, 1999b) provide simple accounts of joint preparation, as Freeman (1997) does for regulatory and administrative

law and Wondolleck and Yaffee (2000) do for management of natural resources. Our objective is to draw on the results of this rich literature, but also to draw theoretical and empirical assumptions about the genus of e-governance..

OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

- i) To assess the social impact of e-governance in Bihar.
- ii) To assess the role of e-governance in Bihar.

HYPOTHESIS OF THE STUDY

The model of e-governance is beneficial for people of Bihar.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Several government records and studies have been analyzed in the latest study work to determine the social effect of e-governance in Bihar.

E-GOVERNANCE MODEL

We gathered a broad variety of case studies from the literature, armed with a working description of E-governance. We did this in traditional fashion: we reviewed articles systematically through a broad variety of

fields, including public health professional articles, education , social services, foreign affairs, etc. Using a broad spectrum of search words, including those mentioned above and several others, we have performed key word electronic searches (e.g., " administration," citizen engagement," alternate dispute resolution"). Of necessity, in the situations we discovered, we have checked up on the literature cited. Our model is essentially based on an overview of 137 events. Our quest was confined to literature in English, while foreign in nature, and therefore, American cases are overrepresented.

Only a cursory analysis of our proceedings still shows the proceedings of natural resource management are overrepresented. This is not due to any sampling prejudice on our side, but rather represents the significance of collective methods for local resource conflict management. Any of the reports we examined were case studies of an effort in a single field to introduce e-governance. The universe of cases we received, as you would expect, was very diverse and the cases varied in consistency, technique, and purpose. While our definition was restrictive in order to encourage contrast of apples with apples, it was also one of our priorities to reflect this diversity. In several separate policy fields, we saw projects of e-governance bubbling up, with no sense that they were engaging in a similar approach of governance.

Surely, we thought, they will benefit from each other from these different tests. This diversity proved to be a problem, however. Our original purpose was not effective in treating these cases as a large-N data collection subject to quasi-experimental statistical evaluation. As it is helpful for both researchers and clinicians to consider how we came to our findings, we write briefly on the challenges we faced in carrying out our meta-analysis. There were frustrating early attempts at formal coding, and we quickly gained an appreciation of our problem. While certain significant theoretical points were already made by academics researching e-governance, the vocabulary used to explain what was going on was far from standardized.

And while we were attempting to "code" experiments, we found ourselves groping to find a standard definition and appraisal vocabulary. A significant issue of "missing data" is applied to this task, a result of the researchers' widely varying reasons, and we concluded that a quasi-experimental method was ill-advised. In the end, we pushed towards a meta-analytical method, which we call successive approximation. A subset of our cases were chosen and used to build a standard "model" of e-governance.⁴

We then picked additional subsets of case studies arbitrarily. The second subset was used in the first round to "validate" the concept produced

and then to further "optimize" the concept. To validate the second-round model, a third set of cases was used, and so on. We are under no assumption, however, that this mechanism has created the "only" paradigm of e-governance. In both defining and assessing our model, there was a major aspect of art involved. When we continued, the difficulty of the collective phase frustrated us. Beyond what we thought would potentially be beneficial for decision leaders and clinicians, variables and causal associations proliferated. Our model, thus, reflects a deliberate effort to simplify the description of main variables and their relationships as much as possible. This simplification aim prompted us to highlight similar and regular outcomes throughout cases. This tactic increases the generality of our observations but ignores the literature's less universal or commonly reported observations. Toward the end of our research, we were ourselves in dispute over how main partnerships should be portrayed. To resolve these gaps, we used the final round of case study.

Imbalances of Power / Resource

A widely noted issue in e-governance is power imbalances between stakeholders. The e-governance mechanism would be vulnerable to abuse by stronger players if any stakeholders do not have the

opportunity, organisation, position, or capital to participate, or to participate on an equal footing with other stakeholders. Bradford (1998), for instance, reveals that the Government of Ontario's efforts to establish worker preparation and workplace health and safety programs by collective means were undermined by the advantageous position of businesses that were able to obtain access to senior officials by "informal networks." Such imbalances inevitably create mistrust or poor devotion (Gray 1989, 119; Warner 2006). American environmental organisations are highly wary of e-governance because they believe it is favorable to business interests (McCloskey 2000).

For instance, Echeverria (2001) criticises the Joint Watershed Planning Mechanism of the Platte River since he believes that the negotiation table is unequal and weighted against the needs of growth. He believes that there are broadly distinct capacities for construction concerns and conservation activists. Conservation activists are routinely at a disadvantage in elections with leaders with comparatively more unified and more readily mobilized economic interests because their constituency is both broad and dispersed.

Schuckman (2001) suggests that collaborative mechanisms are biased toward conservation interests without clear countermeasures to represent less potent perspectives and without "impartial" organization

leadership. When critical stakeholders may not have the operational infrastructure to be served in e-governance systems, the issue of power imbalances is especially troublesome. For eg, English (2000) suggests that the more the involved stakeholders are diffused, and the broader the issue horizon, the harder it would be to serve stakeholders in collective systems. The concern is that coordinated stakeholder associations do not operate in several situations to jointly serve specific stakeholders (Buanes et al . 2004; Rogers et al . 1993).

Another popular concern is that certain stakeholders do not have the capacity and experience to participate in extremely specialized concern discussions (Gunton and Day 2003; Lasker and Weiss 2003; Merkhofer, Conway, and Anderson 1997; Warner 2006; Murdock, Wiessner, and Sexton 2005). A third popular concern is that certain stakeholders do not have the resources, capacity or independence to participate in collaborative processes that are time-intensive (Yaffee and Wondolleck 2003). Neither of these questions is inherently insurmountable. Collaboration proponents have pointed to a number of methods that can be used to motivate weaker or under-represented groups.

FACILITATIVE LEADERSHIP

In taking parties to the table and leading them across the difficult spots of the collaborative process, leadership is commonly viewed as a vital ingredient. Although

"unassisted" talks are often feasible, the literature largely finds that facilitative leadership is essential for bringing stakeholders together and having them to engage each other in a constructive spirit. Susskind and Cruikshank (1987) propose increasingly more interventionist negotiating strategies in defining three types of "assisted bargaining," to the degree that partners are reluctant to agree directly.

Facilitation is the least invasive of stakeholder management prerogatives; the function of a facilitator is to maintain the dignity of the mechanism of consensus-building itself. Mediation enhances the role of third party involvement where parties are inefficient in discussing potential win-win gains in the practical aspects of the agreement. Finally, if, with the aid of mediation, stakeholders may not find an agreement, the third party can draw up a compromise (non-binding arbitration).

Vangen and Huxham (2003a) suggest that leaders must sometimes intervene in a more directive fashion to form the agenda in order to drive cooperation forward. For developing and upholding consistent ground rules, building confidence, fostering communication, and exploring shared benefits, leadership is critical. Vangen and Huxham (2003a) argue that leadership is necessary for stakeholders to be accepted, motivated, and engaged and then mobilized to advance cooperation. Chrislip and Larson (1994, 125) identify the collaborative leader as a process steward (transforming, assistant, or facilitative leadership) whose leadership style is "... distinguished by its emphasis on fostering and safeguarding the mechanism (rather than on substantive action taken by

individual leaders)." Scholars say that unique styles of leadership are needed for e-governance.

For instance, Ryan (2001, 241) recognizes three components of "efficient" collaborative leadership: appropriate collaborative process control, retaining "professional integrity" and ensuring that the collaborative is encouraged to "make accurate and persuasive decisions that are reasonable to everyone."

Lasker and Weiss (2001, 31) conclude that collective leaders must have the skills to (1) foster universal and constructive involvement, (2) maintain broad-based power and control, (3) facilitate the complexities of effective communities, and (4) expand the reach of the mechanism. Instead of depending on one leader, effective partnerships can often use several leaders, formally and informally (Bradford 1998; Lasker and Weiss 2003). Huxham and Vangen (2000) stress that time, money, and expertise are likely to be intensive for successful collective leadership.

INSTITUTIONAL Architecture IN Architecture

Here, institutional architecture applies to the specific procedures and ground rules for cooperation, which are essential to the collaborative process's procedural validity. Probably the most basic architecture challenge is accessibility to the collaboration mechanism itself. Who needs to be included? It is not shocking to see that the e-governance literature stresses that the mechanism must be transparent and that only groups that feel they have a valid ability to engage are likely to build a "contribution to

the process." As Chrislip and Larson (1994) write, "The first prerequisite of effective cooperation is that it must be widely inclusive of all parties who are af. As Gray (1989, 68) states, there would inevitably be disagreements about the legality of involving particular stakeholders, but "... effective collaboration depends on including a large enough range of stakeholders to represent the question." The effort to remove those stakeholders eventually challenged the validity of the mechanism in the coal collaboration she researched (Gray 1989, 155). Wide intervention is not merely accepted but must be vigorously pursued.

For example, Reilly (2001) showed that active collaborators pay significant attention to involving stakeholders and that excluding important stakeholders is a key explanation for failure. Koch (2005, 601) observed in his analysis of the electric industry that e-governance involved the participation of "small enterprises and public power organisations" that were historically removed from conventional governance models.

Broad-based inclusion is not merely a representation of E-governance 's transparent and cooperative nature. It is at the center of a mechanism of legitimization focused on (1) the ability for citizens to negotiate policy outcomes with others and (2) the argument that a broad-based agreement is the policy outcome. Therefore, poor or noninclusive participation tends to weaken the validity of joint findings.

Therefore, constructive methods to mobilize less well-represented stakeholders are also seen as important. However, stakeholders do not have an opportunity to engage, as we showed earlier, particularly if they see alternate places to enact their agenda. The

literature indicates that inclusiveness is also strongly related to the collaborative forum's exclusiveness. It is simpler to inspire members to engage while the collective platform is "the only game in town"; on the other hand, when they are removed, they might be impelled to look for alternate venues. For instance, Kraft and Johnson (1999, 136) noticed that, after being removed from the Fox River Alliance in Wisconsin, environmental groups developed a "alternate platform".

The presence of alternate platforms, of instance, may often be viewed as a derogatory precondition for productive cooperation. As Reilly (2001, 71) puts it, "When alternate methods of settlement occur, it is theorized that a collaborative form of settlement is not desirable." Fung and Wright (2001, 24) observe that "participants would be far more inclined to participate in serious deliberation when alternatives to it are rendered less appealing by roughly balanced alternatives, such as strategic dominance or withdrawal from the mechanism entirely."

Leaders are asking partners to participate in negotiating in good conscience and to discuss prospects for consensus and shared benefits. Yet partners with a cynical frame of mind frequently join into the collaboration phase. They are responsive to ownership problems, worried about the influence of other owners, and alive with the risk of exploitation. The credibility of the mechanism relies, in part, on the expectations of stakeholders that they have earned a "reasonable hearing." Transparent and regularly enforced ground rules reassure stakeholders that the mechanism is equitable, fair and transparent (Murdock, Wiessner, and Sexton 2005). Transparency of the process ensures

that consumers should be assured that public agreements are "genuine" and that the joint process is not a front for secret backroom transactions.

It may also be necessary to specifically identify functions (Alexander, Ease, and Weiner 1998). For example, Bradford (1998, 565) argues in his analysis of an Ontario partnership that it was not obvious if the role of state officials was to provide "feedback to the social participants, clarify[y] expectations about appropriate results[or lead] the planning phase." Thus, formalization of governance processes is often seen as an essential design function.

THE COLLABORATIVE PROCESS

E-governance method models often define cooperation as emerging in phases. For instance, the consensus-building method is defined by Susskind and Cruikshank (1987, 95) as having a pre-negotiation phase, a negotiation phase, and an implementation phase; Gray (1989) describes a three-step collaborative method: (1) issue setting, (2) path setting, and (3) implementation; and Edelenbos (2005, 118) describes a three-step process involving planning, policy formation, and implementation.

To draw attention to the evolving techniques of collaboration as background shifts, a stage model of collaboration is important. Yet we were hit in our reading of the literature by the manner in which the collective approach is cyclical rather than linear. Collaboration always seemed to depend on the achievement of a virtuous cycle of contact, confidence, loyalty, comprehension, and performance (Huxham 2003; Imperial

2005). This cyclical, or iterative, method is necessary for all levels of partnership, if you choose. We found it challenging to reflect the interactive mechanism and we believe this is precisely because of the interaction 's nonlinear character. Our description of the mechanism of partnership as a loop is obviously a great simplification of itself. Nevertheless, it brings attention to the manner in which input from early cooperation may have a positive or negative effect on future cooperation. It's also hard to grasp where to begin a summary of the collaborative process. Since conversation is at the center of teamwork, however, we continue with face-to - face discussion.

All e-governance builds on a conversation with stakeholders face-to - face. The "dense contact" allowed by direct discussion is necessary as a consensus-oriented mechanism for stakeholders to find opportunities for mutual benefit. Face-to - face conversation, though, is more than just the means of negotiation. It is at the heart of the process of breaking down prejudices and other contact obstacles that, in the first instance, hinder discovery of shared benefits (Bentrup 2001). It is at the center of a faith building mechanism, mutual interest, common awareness, and loyalty to the mechanism.

We claim that an essential but not adequate prerequisite for cooperation is face-to - face conversation. It is possible for face-to - face conversation, for instance, to intensify prejudices or disparities of rank or to raise antagonism and reciprocal contempt. Yet without face-to - face dialogue, it is hard to picture productive teamwork. Examples on the way stereotypes have been broken down by faceto-face contact abound in the literature on cooperation.

Although the language used in the literature differs quite broadly, case studies show that the degree of engagement of partners to cooperation is a key variable in describing progress or failure. Margerum (2002) noticed in a study of American and Australian collaborating groups that "participant engagement" was the most significant aspect that encouraged collaboration. Public agencies' poor dedication to cooperation, particularly at the level of headquarters, is sometimes seen as a specific issue. Of necessity, dedication is strongly linked to the initial impetus to take part in e-governance. Yet stakeholders should prefer to engage in order to guarantee that their opinion is not ignored or that their role is valid or that a legal duty is met, etc.

Commitment to the mechanism, on the other side, suggests cultivating a conviction that the only approach to obtain favorable policy results is to negotiate in good conscience for reciprocal benefit. A conviction like that is not altruistic. A developer will think that participating in a good-faith negotiating attempt with environmentalists is the best way to have his houses constructed. Yet collaboration engagement may also entail a very necessary psychological change, particularly for those who consider their roles in utter terms.

As a first step, such a change involves what "reciprocal recognition" or "shared affection" is often called. Commitment also presents a difficult dilemma. And if they can move in the path that a stakeholder does not completely endorse, adherence to the collaborative process needs an up-front desire to cooperate with the outcomes of deliberation. The consensus-oriented foundation of e-governance, of course, dramatically decreases the

threats to stakeholders. Nevertheless, negotiation processes will lead in unpredictable ways, and stakeholders will face pressure to adhere to roles that they do not completely support (Saarikoski 2000). It is clear to understand that confidence is such an integral component of cooperation. Commitment relies on faith that the views and priorities will be heard by other stakeholders. It is therefore plain to understand how loyalty is essential to simple, equitable, and straightforward procedures. Stakeholders must be assured that the procedure of deliberation and consultation has credibility before agreeing to a phase that may move in unexpected directions. A feeling of dedication and ownership will be strengthened as attendance grows.

CONCLUSION

A sweet compensation is promised by the word "E-governance." It seems to promise that we will escape the high costs of adversarial decision formation, increase political engagement, and even return rationality to public administration if we rule collaboratively. A number of the studies discussed here have pointed to the importance of constructive strategies: bitter enemies have often learned to participate in meaningful discussions; more fruitful partnerships with stakeholders have been built by public managers; and advanced ways of mutual collaboration and problem sharing have been established.

However, some reports point to the challenges that partnership initiatives pose when they pursue these respected results: the mechanism is exploited by strong stakeholders; public authorities show genuine dedication to collaboration; and mistrust remains an obstacle to

the negotiation in good faith. In this report, our goal was to put together positive and negative results into a standard analytical structure that can begin to define the conditions under which e-governance can be expected to run (at least in terms of "mechanism results") and where we might anticipate it to be established. Our conclusions are essentially empirically inductive, focusing on a meta-analysis of 137 e-governance research spanning a number of policy fields, while we have also tried to draw on and integrate prior theoretical study.

Our aim was to classify the contingent conditions that promote or hinder active cooperation in the analysis of these empirical and theoretical studies. Our purpose was to step past a scenario in which e-governance is treated as necessarily "positive" or "evil." In addressing these contingent situations, we want scholars and practitioners to question themselves about the contextual factors that are likely to promote or hinder e-governance's desired effects. We agree that this "backup" strategy is beneficial both for clinicians who will consider pursuing a collective method and for researchers designing potential studies.

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